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HOW FAR ARE WE ATTAINING A NEW MEASURE OF
VALUES IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
JURISTIC THOUGHT!*
ROSCOE POUND**

Philosophical jurisprudence has for it task to understand, organize and criticize the ideal element in law - meaning by "law"
the body of -authoritative materials of judicial and administrative
determination -- and the ideals behind the legal order and in the
background not only of the judicial process but of the legislative,
the administrative and the juristic processes as well. Such ideals
furnish the measure of values which governs the selection of interests to be recognized, governs the delimitation of recognized interests, and is ultimately decisive as to the means of securing interests
when recognized and delimited. I have discussed this subject in so
many different connections that I need not labor it here. Nor
need I argue that the received ideals of the last century do not
present an adequate picture of American society of today and
that, in consequence, philosophical jurisprudence has an exceptional opportunity, if a heavy task, of finding for us more adequate
ideals, making them clear to us and organizing them, and thus
providing a measure of values in line with the time and place.
The constant phenomenon of almost evenly divided courts whenever questions of reasonableness are involved, the profound differences of judicial and professional view as to the scope and content
of constitutional guarantees and constitutional grants of power
to the federal government speak for themselves. Such divisions
Paper read before the Round Table on Jurisprudence and Legal History
at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, New
Orleans, Louisiana, December 28, 1935.
** Dean of the Law School, Harvard University.
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and differences of opinion but reflect diverse conceptions of the
end of the legal order due to the giving over of old received ideals
in whole or in part without acquiring new ones with equal
authority.
It has often happened that development has gone on in actual
legal precepts and doctrines and has been followed by a development in juristic thought by which the legal development is formulated and organized. Thus a critique of the practical development is made possible from which that development is enabled to
go forward more effectively. Something of this sort has been going
on for more than a generation. From the standpoint of malting
legal institutions effective for their purpose, the courts and the
leaders of the practising profession were ahead of the legal science
of the time. While the jurists of every school were agreed in
conceiving of a maximum of free individual self-assertion as the
end of the legal order, from the last quarter of the century on,
the courts and lawmakers found themselves continually pushed
toward a new approach to legal problems because of the pressure
df unrecognized or unsecured interests.
In the transition from the relationally organized society of
the Iidde Ages at and after the Reformation, the Protestant
jurist theologians, and even more the Spanish jurist theologians
of the counter-Reformation, laid the foundations of modern juristic thought in a time of growth and accompanying individualizing,
for the time being, of the judicial and juristic processes. Even if
it made but a beginning, their work went far to give direction to
growth and stability to the law. There is like work to be done
today. We must be finding out the meaning of the changes which
throughout the world are going on in the body of authoritative
materials of determining controversies. We must be finding out
upon what principles these changes may be organized, what idea
of justice they postulate, what ideal they offer us in place of that
of yesterday.
Our bills of rights, speaking from the end of the eighteenth
century, but taking their content chiefly from Coke's Institutes
and their philosophical basis from the Continental writers on
natural law, are in truth bills of liberties rather- than bills of rights.
They guarantee freedom of individual activity as against restraining governmental action, either absolutely or to the extent of securing against arbitrary restraint; and this maintaining of a
maximum of free individual activity is postulated as I he highest
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good. As it is put by Sutherland, J., in the District of Columbia
Minimum Wage Case: "To sustain the individual freedom of
action contemplated by the Constitution, is not to strike down the
common good but to exalt it; for surely the good of society as a
whole cannot be better served than by the preservation against
arbitrary restraint of the liberties of its constituent members. '1
Here, it will be observed, restraint is prima facie arbitrary. The
postulated individual freedom of action interprets the conception
of the arbitrary as well as justifies the precepts securing against
it. This idea of unshackling men, of casting off restraints as far
as possible and forbidding imposition of new ones, is common to
all schools of juristic thought in the last century. Metaphysical
jurists, historical jurists, utilitarians, positivists, and anarchist
individualists alike assert it. Indeed, it was carried into every
Spencer conceived of the progress from
domain of thought.
status to contract as the rational outcome of the universe. He
took abstract freedom of contract, a subjection to restraint only as
a result of willed understanding, to be, as one might say, the ideal
toward which evolution continually tended.
At and after the Reformation there is a significant change in
juristic thought. Instead of thinking of the legal order in terms
of restraint, jurists begin to think of it in terms of promoting
activity. Antiquity thought of the task of the legal order as one
of harmonious maintaining of the social status quo. Men were not
to seek to carve out a place for themselves to the disturbance of
the social order. They were or were to be put in their place in an
ordered society and were to be held there to do in an orderly way
that for which they were deemed fitted. The later Middle Ages
had the same idea, accepting the authority of Aristotle and of
Justinian, although it fitted the feudal order no less well than that
of the city state of antiquity, and might have been reached independently if the philosophers had not found it in their books. A
movement toward a different conception goes along with the social,
political, and economic changes which mark the transition from
the mediaeval to the modern world. It follows the revival of
learning with its extravagant faith in reason - to become in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a faith in individual reason.
It goes along with the rise of nations - of Spain, France, England, Austria - with the concomitant idea of the lawmaking
authority of the local sovereign as distinguished from a universal
1 Adldns v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 561, 43 S. Ct. 394 (1923).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1936

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [1936], Art. 2
84

TWENTIETH-CENTURY JURISTIC THOUGHT

authority, and the consequent fostering of local creative legal
activity. It goes along with an era of discovery and colonization
in which pioneer adventurous individualism gives color to everything. It accompanies the rise of trade and commerce in an era
of captains of commerce comparable to our later era of captains
of industry. It follows upon the breakdown of relationally organized society and the resulting growth of faith in individual free
activity.
Such a change in the conception of the legal order is first to
be remarked in the writings of the Spanish jurist-theologians of
the counter-Reformation. We find them thinking of the legal
order not as a device to maintain a social status quo but as a device to maintain a "natural" (i. e., an ideal) equality, which significantly is to be an equality of action not an equality of condition. Compare such a conception with Melanehthon's definition
of liberty as the condition "in which each is permitted to keep his
own and citizens are not compelled to do anything contrary to
principles of right and to what is honorable." Here the first half
is the suum cuique tribuere of the Roman books. The social order
has made something yours. You are to hold it. The other half,
which today we should put positively - that men should be left
free to do things - is still negative. It conceives that restraint is
to be employed rather than constraint and that constraint is' not
to go against right and good morals. The idea of free individual
activity as an end is only just beginning to penetrate to juristic
thought. Gradually but steadily the stress changes from a regime
of restraint expressed in duties to a regime of liberties - of conditions of hands off - expressed in rights. By the nineteenth century the transition is complete from the idea of justice as a maintaining of the social status quo to an idea of justice as the securing
of a maximum of individual free self-assertion.
Kant put this conception of the legal order in its final form.
It is true he thinks of the legal order in Greek fashion as a condition, not in recent fashion as a process. But the condition of which
he thinks is one of the fullest and freest individual activity, restrained only by the reciprocal action of free wills upon each other,
imposing limits by a necessity inherent in the very idea of freedom. Restraint is to be a means, freedom an end. The legal
order is to keep self-conscious beings from collision with each
other, in order that they may be as unrestrained as the equal nonrestraint of their fellows will allow.
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What Kant saw and felt was, no doubt, the possibility of independence in our mental life. We can, if we will, live our individual mental life. But in an urban industrial society, in a
world bound together by rapid universal transportation and economic unification, there is no such independence in our social, in
our economic, life. There is rather, as Duguit has argued, interdependence. Nor can our mental life be as isolated as Kant saw
it. A mental and moral giant like Kant could live such a free life
of the spirit. But in the -world of today, the mental life of most
of us is shaped largely by the pressure of the thinking of our fellow men to a conformity demanded by the exigencies of the economic order as it was shaped in the past by the exigencies of a
religious or a political order.
Ideas are likely to be worked out to their full logical development only as they are moribund. The most perfect logical scheme
of a feudal polity is the Assize of Jerusalem, a theoretical plan of
a developed feudal organization, never put into effect, but devised
at a time when the tide had definitely turned and another type
of political organization was at hand. The full logical development
of the conception of tenure in Littleton's Tenures, comes during
the Wars of the Roses when tenure is on the way to be superseded
by ownership. In like manner, men may well say in the future
that the attempt in American legislation, in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, to enforce a regime of free abstract acquisitive
self-assertion by prescribing unrestrained and unmitigated competition, up and down the scale, upon all activities, came when it
required legislation to compel something in which men had ceased
in their hearts to believe, although adhering to it in their minds.
It is significant that in the English-speaking world down to
the present generation men were extremely solicitous about liberty. Anything which seemed to threaten liberty was met by obstinate resistance. It was enough to invoke liberty to insure rejection of any proposal, legal, political, or economic. Today the
appeal to liberty fails to awaken like enthusiasm. The invocation
of liberty has little or no staying effect upon new proposals. The
threat to liberty inspires few fears. We are coming to put the
value somewhere else. In the present generation, there has been
a steady growth of legislative and administrative restriction upon
every form of activity. A bulletin recently issued with a foreword
by an official of the Department of Commerce, entitled "Municipal Control of Retail Trade in the United States," shows thirty
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types of retail business municipally regulated in Chicago, twentyfive in Los Angeles, twenty-three in Newark, N. J., twenty-two in
Portland, Oregon, twenty-one in Milwaukee, and twenty each in
New York City and in Baltimore - all this in addition to state
regulation of many others. Even if it failed by reason of constitutional limitations, the NRA, with its multitude of restrictions,
is highly significant. No one would have dreamed of such a regime
in the last century. Wide acceptance of the AAA by farmers,
the old guard of American individualism, is no less significant.
Look for a moment at the changes which have gone on in the
body of authoritative materials of decision or precepts for conduct in the past fifty years. These changes have come about quite
as much by judicial decision as by legislation. Often they are due
to the two working together. They are all in one direction.
In the nineteenth century, freedom of contract was the ark of
the covenant. Bentham's whole program turned upon it - extend
the sphere and enforce the obligation of contract. The historical
jurists saw in it the goal of legal evolution - a progress from
status to contract - and the positivists agreed. American courts
regarded freedom of contract as guaranteed by the constitutional
guarantees of liberty, and took all interference therewith, except
to promote a wider freedom of contract, as arbitrary and unreasonable. I need not remind you of how British legislation since
1865 and American legislation, despite constitutional limitation,
since 1880, have been going in the opposite direction. Nor need I
remind you of American judicial decision making the same change
of front in the same period.
Again, courts and jurists of fifty years ago insisted upon the
jus utendi and jus abutendi of an owner.
These things were
corollaries of ownership. The concern was to leave to the owner
the widest possible freedom of use of his property limited only by
like freedom of use of his property by the neighbor. So there was
no nuisance and no trespass, so the use or abuse operated only on
the land of the actor, he might put up spite fences and dig spite
wells as freely as he chose. Today courts and legislatures have
worked a complete change.
Again, the nineteenth century philosophical jurists regarded
the jus disponendi as involved in the very idea of property. I need
not remind you of the limitations upon this power which have
sprung up all over the world. Nor need I remind you of the continual growth of restrictions upon the enforcement of demands
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nor of the recent development of restrictions upon the authority
of those having control over others. Mistake not. These last
restrictions are not in the interest of more free activity in those
subject to control so much as in recognition of a social claim to
full moral and social individual life, where formerly the free
activity of the one having legal custody was the only thing looked
at.
Nor need I more than remind you of the growth of restraints
upon free acquisition of res nullius, upon free use of res communes, and upon waste of individually owned natural resources,
which have developed in the law of the present century, and are
reducing many categories of the past to a single category of res
publicae. This is part of a world wide phenomenon which Duguit
has called the socialization of property, meaning thereby not that
property is becoming collective instead of individual, but that the
use of it is coming to be regarded as a social function and regulated accordingly.
Again, note the development in the present century of liability without fault - the imposition upon the individual of liability
which he has not willed either by voluntary undertaking or by
willed aggression or by willed culpable conduct. American courts
stood out against this, and text writers prophesied in the last century that what they called a historical anomaly would disappear
from the law.
But Rylands v. Fletcher2 has been applied by
analogy in the English Chancery Division within a few years, and
the weight of judicial authority has been shifting in America. The
idea of letting landowners act as freely as possible is giving way
here also.
But enough of these examples. I need only recall to you the
enormous growth of administrative guidance and regulation of
enterprise both in Great Britain and the United States and remind
you that American courts which would not hear of those things in
the 70's of the last century, now take them as a matter of course.
A like change has been going on in juristic thought. The
ideal of the immediate past was complete freedom of the individual,
so far as attainable through the legal order. We called it individualism. Today we have yet to fnd a name for an ideal we have yet
to formulate, but it involves something very different from a regime
of unfettered free competitive self-assertion. Since the Reformation there had been a growing legal nationalism, characteristically
2 L. R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
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developed to the full in the English-speaking world. In the United
States it took form in a cult of local law and is represented today
by a rising cult of the single decision. On the other hand, we may
see everywhere a return of faith in the universal and a revival of
the idea of a general law. In the last century, jurists were agreed
upon individual free self-assertion as the end of the legal order.
Today many, at least, see effective co-operative activity as a means
along with free individual activity toward an end of civilization.
In the lact century there was general agreement in putting the
single individual as of ultimate significance. Tday many, at least,
see ultimate significance in the highest development of human
powers.
Contrast with the juristic individualism of the last century
the revival of the idea of relation, which had persisted in the common law from the relationally organized society of the Middle
Ages, but was rejected by our historical jurists of the last generation as archaic. One may see on every hand in legislation, in administration, and more and more in judicial decision, that the
nineteenth-century ideal of the free individual will as the central
point in the legal order is giving way before a renewed tendency
to think of men not as isolated in ideal conditions but as associated
in concrete relations. There is a renewed tendency to think of men
as in a society in which they are all in every sort of relation with
their fellow men and their most significant activities for the legal
order take place in or have to do with these relations.
Today nationalism is rampant in politics, but the movement
in law is the reverse. Note the juristic periodicals co-operated
in by scholars from every part of the world which have been multiplying of late; the congress on comparative law which has had one
highly successful session and is about to have another; the collections of the laws of the world on common plans; the increasing
number of libraries of the law and laws of every land - not
merely of the local jurisdiction; the growth of interest in philosophy of law, whereas in the nineteenth century men felt the local
law needed no philosophy, or, if there was a philosophy, it was one
of laws - of locally valid rules - not one of law, of a generally
valid body of ideals and technique and doctrines and conceptions
and principles.
We in the United States, in the nineteenth century, went
farthest in thinking of a distinctively local local-law as an end.
But note the things making for universality, making against the

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol42/iss2/2

8

Pound: How Far Are We Attaining a New Measure of Values in Twentieth-Cen

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
cult of or faith in local law as something intrinsically 'desirable.
One is the doctrine of the federal courts as to independent judgment upon questions of general and commercial law, making the
law uniform for those courts, however diverse in the states in
which they sit. Although continually under attack from those who
are hostile to federal jurisdiction, this doctrine has maintained itself for nearly a century, and its survival through the era of local
law and apprentice trained local lawyers speaks for itself. Second, one may vouch the work of the commissioners on uniform
state laws. It has proved easy to induce the states to co-operate in
the matter of legislation on commercial law in the present century, though it was hard to induce even a partial co-operation in
so vital a matter as the common defense in the eighteenth century.
Third, it is enough to point to the restatement of the common law
going on under the auspices of the American Law Institute and the
unprecedented co-operation therein of judges, practitioners, and
law teachers. Fourth, one may note the influence of national as
contrasted with local law schools, becoming marked after 1870.
The case book, drawing on the recorded judicial experience of
the whole English-speaking world, beginning in 1870, triumphed
in the present century over study from lists of cases in the local
reports. Along with these we must put, likewise, the revival of
comparative law - the most effective antidote to the idea of the
worth of local law simply as a local possession. Comparative law
is a force for bringing back the universal ideal in an economically
unified world.
As to the recent cult of the single decision, I take that to be in
jurisprudence what philosophical anarchy is in politics. Indeed,
it is, like philosophical anarchy, or anarchist individualism, as it
might better be called, an outgrowth of the economic realism of
the latter part of the nineteenth century. Like the latter, it makes
confident pretensions to a peculiar or even exclusive touch with
reality. But except as it continues the current of economic realism,
it seems to me to do no more than seek to explain phenomena of
what has been called the socialization of law which are transient
and admit of a simpler explanation. In all eras of transition and
growth, as compared with those of stability, organization, and
systematization of legal precepts, in all eras of creative activity
drawing from without, as compared with doctrinal activity, developing the body of legal precepts logically from within, there is
for a time an ultra individualizing of the judicial process and no
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less extreme individualizing of juristic thought. Apart from the
attempt at a theory of this to-be-expected phenomenon, as it is
presented in the post-war world, the cult of the single decision is
one of the last gasps of the over-individualist thinking of the nineteenth-century Anglo-American jurist. As we see it today, it adds
nothing to the economic determinism of Brooks Adams beyond a
Freudian or behaviorist terminology - things not available when
Brooks Adams wrote.
As to the postulating of individual free self-assertion as the
end of the legal order, one has only to measure the truck acts, the
factory acts, the minimum wage laws, the collective bargaining
laws, the blue sky laws, the loan shark or small loans laws, the
laws setting up agricultural commissions, and, indeed, the subjection of all callings of every sort to administrative control, which,
whether or not it all proves to be proof against constitutional objections, is characteristic of the time, to see that some new end is
being postulated increasingly.
So also as to the postulating of the single individual as of
ultimate juristic significance. In comparison with Kant and Spencer, who thought in this way, put Stammler, with his doctrine of
a community of free willing men; put Duguit, with his doctrine
of interdependence through division of labor. In comparison with
Hegel, who, indeed, saw something of what was to come, as shown
by his organic conception of ethics, put the Hegelian left, as Croce
aptly styles it, culminating in the regimentation of individuals in
the great Marxian political society of today.
No less than six important changes in juristic thought have
taken place in the last fifty years - all tending in a new direction.
One is, the insistence on function rather than on content; the
tendency to ask how do precepts work, to ask can they be made to
bring about just results rather than whether their abstract content
is abstractly just. The moment we ask such questions, however, we
are driven to inquire as to the end of law. For function means
function towards some end. Thus for a generation philosophical
discussion as to the end of the legal order has taken a continually
larger place in jurisprudence.
Second, there has been a shift to an economic emphasis, putting the emphasis on wants rather than on wills, thinking of free
self-assertion as but one of many human wants or demands or desires, and seeking a maximum satisfaction of wants rather than a
maximum freedom of wills. In this way of thinking, Kant's prob-
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lem of harmonizing the will of each in action with that of his
fellows in action, becomes one of harmonizing or adjusting or
integrating conflicting or overlapping wants or demands or desires
in a world in which the goods of existence are limited while the
demands upon them are infinite.
Third, there has come to be an objective, as contrasted with a
subjective emphasis, as, for example, in the general giving up of
Savigny's theory of contract, which the law teachers of the last
century, particularly in England, sought to fasten upon the common law. That theory flowed from the idea of the will as the central point in jurisprudence. Hence the general abandonment of it
today is significant.
Fourth, we must remark the emphasis on concrete claims of
concrete human beings instead of on the abstract will of the abstract individual. Many causes, social, economic, and political
have contributed to require this shift of stress. What especially
compelled jurists thereto was the development of phychology in
the later part of the last century and in the present generation.
Under attack from modern psychology, "the individual," in the
sense of nineteenth-century metaphysical jurisprudence, and the
"individual will," in the sense of the nineteenth-century
pandectists and their English followers in analytical jurisprudence, were as insecure foundations as the "natural man" and the
"state of nature" had proved to be under the attacks of the critical
philosophy a century before.
Fifth, we have to note the movement for team work with the
other social sciences; the study of law as part of a whole process
of social control. This is an essential point in the twentieth-century sociological jurisprudence. Compare it with the characteristic non-cooperation of the social sciences in the nineteenth century.
This ignoring by each of the social sciences of each of the others
was by no means wholly due to the exigencies of university organization and academic courtesy, requiring each scholar to keep
off of his neighbor's premises. It was in the very spirit of the
last century - every man for himself, every subject for itself. It
was in the spirit of the atomistic conception of humanity as an
aggregate of individuals engaged, with a minimum of organization, in a competitive acquisitive struggle for existence. Each subject was thought of as being as independent and self-sufficient as
the independent and self-sufficient individual who pursued it.
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Sixth, we must take note of the recognition of the problem of
a measure or canon of values as something much wider than a
problem of jurisprudence - as a problem of all the social sciences,
to be looked at in jurisprudence both as such and in its special
relation to all the mooted questions of the science of law. This is
something which cannot be dodged by a "pure science of law"
which seeks to repeat the method of English analytical jurisprudence and relegate it to some other science. A jejune jurisprudence which has cast out the ideal element of law and all consideration of what the precepts of what-ought-to-be ought to be,
simply invites the bringing of that element and that consideration
back in unconsciously by side doors, and conscious or unconscious
blundering, and the sort of judicial process which the self-styled
realist of the moment takes to be significant.
Only one third of the present century has elapsed. It is not
until the second half of a century that what we prove to be its characteristic modes of thought stand out definitely. The influence of
the epoch-making writing of Jhering in 1884 is being felt generally in America after half a century. Manifestly one cannot
speak with assurance as to how we are in the end to value competing and overlapping interests in the present century. But
some part of the path of the juristic thought of tomorrow is already apparent. It seems to be a path toward an ideal of cooperation rather than one of competitive self-assertion. Yet cooperation cannot be a wholly satisfactory measure of values for a
system of law. For co-operation is a process. It must be cooperation toward something. I suspect that the idea will prove
to be co-operation toward civilization. But I cannot pretend that
I can draw this from the actual phenomena of the legal order and
th' judicial process with the same assurance with which I can
draw the ideal of free competitive individual self-assertion from
the phenomena of the legal order and the judicial process and the
juristic process (as one may well call it) in the nineteenth century.
Until recently a tradition, sometimes amounting to a settled
habit of non-cooperation began in the locality at the bottom of the
local administrative scale and extended to the top in the departments of the federal government. It was and still is to no small
extent manifest in lack of co-operation of administrative officials
in the same locality with each other, in lack of co-operation among
the independent detecting and investigating agencies in the same
locality, in frequent lack of co-operation between local prosecutors
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and local courts, in friction between local courts and local administrative officials and in lack of co-operation of court with court
or even of judge with judge in the same court. Going up in the
scale there has been and too often still is a like want of do-operation
of locality and state. Refusal of local prosecutors, local sheriffs
and local magistrates to enforce state laws in the locality has often
led to legislation providing for removal by or at the instance of
some central authority. Disinclination or refusal of local police
to enforce state laws have often led to the setting up of state commissions to appoint and control municipal police. State police
have been called for to give effect to state regulations as against
local obstruction, and the old spirit reappears now and then in
conflicts between state police and local constables and local police.
Again, want of co-operation as between different bureaus or
services, even when under the same department, in the federal
government was conspicuous in the attempt to enforce prohibition, and non-cooperation of the administrative officials and the
prosecuting agencies and the federal courts was an everyday

matter.
A want of co-operation of state with state, in a confederation
in which there was no adequate provision for a central government
was one of the chief occasions of our federal constitution. But
the powers of our central government are limited, and in many
matters which have ceased to be local, the old attitude of noncooperation and indifference to the general, as contrasted with
the local, security remains. This attitude has been even more
marked in the matter of co-operation of state and federal agencies.
State interference with enforcement of federal laws, federal interference with state enforcement of state laws, conflicts of jurisdiction between federal and state courts with respect to the same
property or controversy, and indifference of federal and state governments to enforcement of each other's laws have written some
strange things in our law reports. In the present generation there
has been a good beginning in the direction of conscious systematic
co-operation between national and state authorities. That there is
a growing spirit of co-operation is manifest. But it is significant
that this spirit did not begin to grow until our polity was a century old. No less significant is the value now put upon co-operation where in the last century the value put on free individual
self-assertion was so high that what seem to us absurdities did not

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1936

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [1936], Art. 2
94

TWENTIETH-CENTURY JURISTIC THOUGHT

seem too great a price to pay for the extreme of official and local
independence.
Nor has this indifference to co-operation been confined to
agencies of government and administration. An idea of co-operation is much closer to the realities of industry than the conventional idea of free individual self-assertion. After all, employer
and employees are co-operating in great enterprises. It is wasteful to regard them, and so lead them to regard themselves, as
necessarily and at all events engaged in contests with each other.
Moreover, this idea of co-operation is much nearer to the
realities of urban life today than the idea of competitive free selfassertion by which we go on measuring. Simply ask yourself,
as to this city where we are meeting - how many are freely competing, and how many more are doing their part, perhaps in a
modest way, as employees in some great corporate enterprise, finding a reflected glory in its greatness and giving it service in return for protection in a relation very like the old one of lord and
man ?
If co-operation is not to be the whole idea, it is to be a large
part of it. But I prefer to think that the recognition of co-operation and new emphasis upon it in all connections is a step toward
some ideal involving organized human effort along with free spontaneous individual initiative, and I seem to see such an ideal in
the idea of civilization. Indeed, there are signs that twentiethcentury law, in the sense both of the body of authoritative materials of decision and of the judicial process, as well as twentiethcentury juristic thinking, along with concern for the concrete
individual life instead of the abstract individual will, are concerned for civilization as distinct from and contrasted with politically organized society. Since the Reformation, politically organized society has asserted a paramountcy and largely maintained
it, which has sometimes made it appear an end rather than a
means. But the most extreme advocates of an omnicompetent
state have not ventured to go so far.
An ideal of civilization, of raising human powers to their
highest possible unfolding, of the maximum of human control over
external nature and over internal nature for human purposes, must
recognize two factors in achieving that control; on the one hand,
free individual initiative, spontaneous self-assertion of individual
men, and on the other hand co-operative, ordered, if you will,
regimented activity. Neither can be ignored if we are to main-
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tain, go forward with and hand down control over nature. Not
the least achievement of recent thought has been to rid us of the
idea of the unum necessarium. We are no longer bound to believe
that only one of the two, individual freedom of .action and cooperative organized activity, can be taken account of in our picture of human life. We are not precluded from an ideal which
allows both for competition and for co-operation. We are not compelled, because we recognize co-operation as a factor in civilization,
to sacrifice all that was achieved in the last century by working
out a system of individual rights nor what has been achieved
through and since the Puritan revolution toward securing individual freedom as a no less essential factor.
Perhaps you will say that my conclusion is, we don't know
where we are going but we are on our way. But we do know some
part of where we are going and our goal seems, what I suspect
it has always been, though looked at in other ways, the raising of
human powers to their highest unfolding.
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